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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the role and inﬂuence of the EU institutions in major reform
negotiations. We argue that one of the paradoxes of European Council
dominated decision-making has been the enhanced dependence on EU
institutions to translate broad priorities into actual reforms. We substantiate
this claim by means of an in-depth process-tracing analysis of the Fiscal
Compact. The conventional wisdom is that the Fiscal Compact was a German
dictate. Instead, we show that it resulted from a division of labour: political
leadership by member states in the control room, and instrumental leadership
by the institutions in the machine room. Such instrumental leadership is
unjustly depicted as mere facilitation, with little impact on process and
outcome. We juxtapose the Fiscal Compact to two similar cases of Germany-
led EU reforms (the Euro-Plus-Pact and Contractual Arrangements) to reveal
the leadership activities by the institutions and the ﬁngerprints these left in
the ﬁnal outcome.
KEYWORDS Economic and monetary union; EU institutions; European integration; leadership; treaty on
stability coordination and governance
Introduction
The successive crises of the European Union (EU) have led to a vibrant debate
about leadership, whether by particular individuals, member states or by the
EU institutions (e.g., Becker et al. [2016]; Nugent and Rhinard [2016]). Media
sources and scholarly evaluations have put a lot of emphasis on individual
leaders and their (typically limited) ability to steer developments at the
highest political level (what we will call ‘the control room’). The primary
focus has been on Germany (and its Chancellor), the European Commission
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(and its President) or the new European Council (EC) President (Bocquillon and
Dobbels 2014; Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Dinan 2017; Peterson 2015). Some
scholars even linked the ‘mixed’ performance of the EU in dealing with succes-
sive crises to an absence of (eﬀective) leadership at this level. The EU was por-
trayed as ‘failing forward’ or ‘kicking the can down the road’ (Hodson 2013;
Jones et al. 2016; Menz and Smith 2013). Even the arguably most inﬂuential
leader, German Chancellor Merkel, was generally portrayed as the person
blocking, rather than creating eﬀective solutions (‘Frau Nein’). On the side
of the institutions, European Council President Van Rompuy seemingly
played a marginal role, while Commission President Barroso was even less
eﬀective in his self-proclaimed role as ‘champion of the Community method’.
The enhanced presence of the European Council, and the implications of
having a permanent President, have been extensively discussed, among
others, by proponents of ‘new intergovernmentalism’ and ‘core state
powers’ (Bickerton et al. 2015; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014). Intergovern-
mental coordination between the Heads of State and Government (HOSG)
played a more prominent role in the crisis and post crisis years, in determining
the course of EU decision-making. Some of the early literature spoke about
‘competition’ between the intergovernmental and the Community method
and a ‘decline’ of the latter (Chang 2013; Fabbrini 2013). More recent
studies rather framed it as a reorientation by the EU institutions, moving
from classic entrepreneurship to surveillance and policy management
(Becker et al. 2016; Nugent and Rhinard 2016).
Yet, as we will argue, a somewhat overlooked implication of this European
Council dominated decision-making is that it has also weakened the control of
the member states. The informal and ‘isolated’ character of decision-making
at the European Council level, paradoxically, created more instead of less
dependence on EU institutions to translate the broad HOSG priorities into
actual reforms. To be sure, we believe that high level political leadership is
necessary for getting an issue, in our case a balanced budget rule, on the
agenda. However, to translate such vague ideas into an actual legally
binding reform requires instrumental leadership in the ‘machine room’. This
instrumental leadership is typically supplied by institutional actors (EC Presi-
dent’s Cabinet, Commission, Council Secretariat) operating at this level.
To substantiate our claim, we revisit three prime examples of member
state, speciﬁcally German, political leadership in the Eurozone crisis: The
Fiscal Compact, the Euro Plus Pact and Contractual Arrangements. The
latter two cases, in which reform measures turned out to be largely inconse-
quential or even failed to materialize, serve to show what happens when
instrumental leadership is absent. Our main case is the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance (TSCG), often referred to as the Fiscal
Compact. The conventional wisdom is that the Fiscal Compact was a
German dictate. In the words of close observer Peter Ludlow (2011: 34):
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‘This is what the German Chancellor wanted and this is by and large what she
got’. Scholarly assessments, so far, have mainly focused on the proceedings at
and around the December 2011 European Council Summit, thereby treating
the proceedings from the Summit until the signing of the Treaty in March
2012 as the endgame or transposition phase (Degner and Leuﬀen 2017;
Schimmelfennig 2015; Schoeller 2017; Tsebelis and Hahm 2014). Furthermore,
these studies ignored the pre-negotiation stage, in which the Council Sec-
retariat Legal Service translated the initial idea for a balanced budget rule
into actual Treaty text, thereby laying out the tracks for the actual nego-
tiations. Only Tsebelis and Hahm (2014) looked at the successive drafts of
the Treaty that were leaked to the press, but they analyzed these solely
from the perspective of member states bargaining, and ignore drafting and
process management by the institutions.
We contend that a detailed analysis of both the pre-negotiation stage and
the presumed ‘endgame’ is crucial for understanding the new role of EU insti-
tutions. This is what explains the smooth and straightforward process leading
up to the ﬁnal deal, which stands in strong contrast to what happened with
the Euro Plus Pact and Contractual Arrangements.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we look at some of the domi-
nant conceptualizations of leadership, which we believe are too ‘heroic’ in their
ideas about what (institutional) leadership is and what it can accomplish. We
start from the concept of entrepreneurial leadership (Young 1991: 285), but
we disaggregate the leadership tasks, thereby making a distinction between
the type of leadership and the level at which this type is displayed. The
process tracing analysis of the Fiscal Compact reconstructs the leadership activi-
ties that were performed by diﬀerent institutional actors and the ﬁngerprints
that these activities left in the documents. In the Conclusion, we compare
these to the Euro Plus Pact and Contractual Arrangements.
Theory: entrepreneurial leadership ‘unpacked’
The concept of entrepreneurial leadership plays a pivotal role in many theor-
etical and historical analyses of major EU reforms. It was one of the types of
leadership identiﬁed by Young (1991). Leadership is generally deﬁned as
the provision of tasks that help overcome collective action problems that
can prevent parties from reaching a mutually acceptable, binding agreement
(Tallberg 2006: 17–39; Young 1991: 285). Young makes a distinction between
a structural leader – who can use his/her structural position as bargaining
leverage to reshape zones-of-possible agreement – an entrepreneurial
leader – who provides leadership through negotiation skill and process man-
agement – and lastly an intellectual leader – who uses his/her ideas and
expertise to shape the way in which parties frame and think about options,
thereby reshaping zones-of-possible agreement.
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Within the context of the Eurozone crisis, Germany is the obvious, if not
only, candidate for the role of structural leader. German dominance in the
Eurozone stemmed from its economic strength and position as the principal
creditor, which allowed it to have a disproportionate impact on setting the
rules according to which the system behaves. Germany is sometimes por-
trayed as a ‘reluctant’, ‘embedded’, or ‘benign’ hegemon (Blyth and Matthijs
2012; Bulmer and Paterson 2013: 1397), which implies that we cannot
simply equate German overall dominance with active leadership during the
negotiations.
There is also evidence suggesting that Germany acted as an intellectual
leader. Scholars have argued that Germany’s doctrine of ordoliberalism
became the dominant discourse for the larger part of the crisis (Matthijs
2016; Schäfer 2016). However, there is also ample reason to place this intellec-
tual leadership with the ECB, which used its enhanced status and credibly as
leverage in the debates about EMU deepening (De Rynck 2016). In many, but
certainly not all, EMU reform debates Germany and the ECB acted as an intel-
lectual tandem.
Lastly, entrepreneurial leadership refers to leadership provided during the
actual negotiations, by putting issues on the agenda, building political
momentum, and shepherding an issue through the decision-making machin-
ery (Young 1991: 293). It is less obvious to place this form of active leadership
with a particular member state, in our case Germany. First, there is less direct
evidence that Germany actually played such a steering role in the proceedings
at the civil servant level. Second, in complex multi-level negotiations, it is unli-
kely that one single actor – be it a member state or an institution – would be
able to ‘lead the way’ from initial idea to ﬁnal Treaty text. In managing EU
reforms, eﬀective leadership has often been joint leadership.
Yet, many conceptual and historical analyses of leadership still take ‘heroic’
notions of individual leadership as their point of departure. In studies of Euro-
pean integration, leadership is often equated with supranational entrepre-
neurship, meaning the ability to act as the ‘engine’ or ‘motor’ that can drive
the machinery forwards with a clear purpose towards a clearly deﬁned goal,
of the kind supposedly provided by the Delors Committee in the run-up to
the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht (Haas 1958; Moravcsik
1999). In the literature on institutional leadership this ‘Delors type’ resonates
with the concept of ‘transforming’ leadership (Burns 1978: 20).
Over the years, the Delors type of leadership has become a somewhat
unfortunate model of a power-hungry Commission ‘hard wired to pursue
ever closer union’. Even in the days of Delors the institutions primarily
acted as ‘engineers of solutions’, rather than ‘political champions’ (Beach
2005: 103–104; Peterson 2015: 187–188). In a similar way, the concept of trans-
forming leadership is an unfortunate benchmark. The concept originally
stems from Burns distinction between ‘transforming’ and ‘transactional’
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leadership. In Burns’ original interpretation, ‘transforming leadership raises the
level of human conduct and ethical aspirations of both leader and led, and
thus it has a transforming eﬀect on both’ (Burns 1978: 20). Transactional lea-
dership, on the other hand, comes down to facilitating ‘an exchange of valued
things’, in which there is no higher purpose and the preferences and motives
of the parties remain unaﬀected (Burns 1978: 19). In EU studies, transforming
leadership has been redeﬁned as ‘moulding the course and shape of Euro-
pean integration’, while transactional leadership basically refers to proper
management of ‘the daily stuﬀ of politics’ (Tömmel 2013: 791; see also Ross
and Jenson 2017).
It is safe to say that in the history of the EU, episodes of ‘transforming’ lea-
dership are highly exceptional (Hodson 2013: 301–302). It is also clear that in
the post-Maastricht era, the possibilities for providing such leadership have
become even more limited. As the EU moved into more sensitive and
salient issue-areas, such as ﬁscal policy or economic governance, its
member states have become even more wary of transferring competences
(Bickerton et al. 2015: 703; Fabbrini 2013: 1005; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs
2014: 8). The institutions now have to cope with a European Council providing
instructions and having a veto over certain policy options (Bocquillon and
Dobbels 2014: 22).
This again shows that the concept of transforming leadership is too ‘heroic’
in terms of what it expects that leaders can do and accomplish even under
exceptionally favourable circumstances, like in the run-up to the SEA (Ross
and Jenson 2017: 119–120). The concept of transactional leadership, on the
other hand, is all too common. If institutional leadership essentially comes
down to the facilitation of member states negotiations, we can safely categor-
ize all leadership by the institutions as transactional. However, this then does
not provide us with a meaningful metric for assessing institutional inﬂuence.
To arrive at a realistic metric, we suggest that scholars unpack the concept
of entrepreneurial leadership, taking into account the type of leadership and
the level at which this type is displayed. In negotiating major EU reforms, there
is a clear functional diﬀerentiation between the leadership functions that are
required at speciﬁc levels of the negotiations. We make a distinction between
the ‘control room’, which refers to the European Council (and Sherpa) level,
and ‘the machine room’, which refers to the Council (here Eurogroup) and
the preparatory groups at the ambassadors and civil servants level.
In the control room, the leadership tasks required relate to agenda-setting,
the provision of political momentum, and brokerage to ensure that consensus
on the ﬁnal deal is reached. This type of leadership echoes the deﬁnition of
political leadership given by authors such as Ross and Jenson (2017: 114–
115) and Tömmel (2013: 797). At this level, national leaders are the ‘deciders
in chief’ that set overall priorities and settle key points of contention in end
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game negotiations, where institutional actors like the European Council Presi-
dent are more neutral arbiters of agreement.
In the machine room, there is a strong demand for drafting to translate
broad governmental priorities into actual texts, and for process management
to avoid agenda cycling and lowest-common-denominator dynamics that
can hinder parties from securing a mutually acceptable, binding reform (Tall-
berg 2006: 37–39). We use the term instrumental leadership for the provision of
these leadership tasks in the machine room. While major EU reforms, such as
the Fiscal Compact, were intergovernmental negotiations that were held
outside of the formal institutional machinery of daily EU policy-making, the
existing machinery was still utilized. This means that EU institutions had
strong comparative advantages in providing the necessary legal, process
and substantive expertise. National governments either lack the expertise or
would not be trusted by other actors to take over drafting and process man-
agement. Therefore, by default there is a large amount of more informal del-
egation of instrumental leadership tasks to EU institutional actors, in particular
the Council Secretariat and Commission.
While scholars generally acknowledge the impact of political leadership,
they tend to equate instrumental leadership with mere facilitation, that has
little impact on the process and outcome (Moravcsik 1999: 370–374;
Tömmel 2013: 791). However, as we know from principal-agent theorizing,
even the provision of seemingly technical leadership can have signiﬁcant
eﬀects. For example, those holding the pen can subtly steer how a vaguely
deﬁned political preference is translated into actual text. Process managers
can mark out and thereby shape the course of negotiations. We argue that
political leadership in the control room and instrumental leadership in the
machine room are both necessary for securing major EU reforms. Political lea-
dership without instrumental leadership lacks traction, instrumental leader-
ship without political leadership lacks purpose.
Methodological approach
The analyses assess the role and inﬂuence of the EU institutions in current
major reform negotiations. We utilize three cases in our design; all of which
had political leadership by the German government present.1 These cases cor-
respond with Germany’s overall priorities as regards EMU reform: to
strengthen ﬁscal discipline and to induce structural reforms that would
increase the competitiveness of periphery countries (Bulmer and Paterson
2013; Matthijs 2016). Fiscal discipline held centre stage in the 2010 reform
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), by means of the so-called six pack.
By early 2011, the talks continued, with the submission of a joint Franco-
German letter to other EU leaders on 4 February 2011.2 This letter set the
stage for subsequent discussions on a Competitiveness – or Euro Plus – Pact
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(February–March 2011), a Fiscal Compact (October 2011 – March 2012) and
Contractual Arrangements (October 2012 – December 2013). The Euro Plus
Pact was subsequently adopted as a symbolic, non-binding agreement that
was quickly forgotten, whereas Contractual Arrangements did not even
reach the machine room.
Our analysis focuses on the ‘positive’ case: the Fiscal Compact. We treat the
Fiscal Compact as a ‘pathway case’ (Gerring 2017: 105–106). We engage in a
minimalist process-tracing analysis to evaluate the impact of instrumental lea-
dership provided by EU institutions. In minimalist process-tracing, the causal
process is not unpacked into its component parts – instead what is important
is that empirical manifestations of a process are made explicit in the form of
‘diagnostic evidence’ (Bennett and Checkel 2014: 7). In this article, we utilize
two types of diagnostic evidence that can conﬁrm the existence and impact
of instrumental leadership. First, we assess what leadership activities were per-
formed by EU institutional actors (Cabinet oﬃcials of the European Council
President, Council Secretariat, ECB and Commission oﬃcials) in the machine
room. Second, we identify the ﬁngerprints, in the form of clear observable
manifestations of these activities in the ﬁnal outcome. As we know from
legal studies, the same broad priority can be translated into legal text in
ways that completely change its actual meaning, for example ensuring the
provision never works, making it redundant, or subtly changing the focus of
the provision from what was intended (Craig 2012: 233; Peers 2012: 414).
Regarding our sources, the analyses are based on ﬁrst-hand observations of
all primary documents (draft texts by institutions, proposals from govern-
ments). Moreover, the contributors were personally involved in the
decision-making and/or have held multiple rounds of conversations with
other key participants from the member states and institutions. To avoid
source capture, we have corroborated these insider recollections with evi-
dence that is publicly available, along with detailed comparisons of the
diﬀerent drafts of the treaties and other documentary sources (Franco-
German letters, existing and proposed EU legislation). As a ﬁnal step in our
analyses, we provide a comparison of the Fiscal Compact with two ‘negative’
cases. To demonstrate causal necessity, the absence of the condition should
result in the absence of the outcome. We will therefore discuss what elements
of instrumental leadership were missing in the Euro Plus Pact and Contractual
Arrangements and how this contributed to their demise.
Process tracing analysis: instrumental leadership and the Fiscal
Compact
The Fiscal Compact was agreed at the EU Summit of 30 January and signed on
2 March 2012 by all EU member states except the Czech Republic and the
United Kingdom. The main elements, reﬂected in Article 3.1. and 3.2, are
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that ‘the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party
shall be balanced or in surplus’ and that this shall be incorporated into national
law ‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably
constitutional’. The Fiscal Compact is seen as perhaps the most prominent
example of Germany’s ability ‘to shape the terms of integration’ (Schimmelfen-
nig 2015: 187). However, when we look closer, there is evidence that while
German political leadership ensured that we got a Fiscal Compact, the form
it took was shaped by instrumental leadership in the machine room. In the fol-
lowing, we ﬁrst uncover the activities of the institutional network, followed by
an assessment of the eﬀects that they had on the ﬁnal outcome.
Institutional activities
The negotiations were triggered by a Franco-German letter to European
Council President Van Rompuy on 17 August 2011 that expanded on many
of the themes from the letter of 4 February.3 Compared to the February
letter, the August letter was quite speciﬁc about a balanced budget rule as
such. What was still unclear was how this balanced budget rule could be incor-
porated into EU law in a workable fashion, the legal form of its incorporation
and whether other aspects of the Franco-German letter related to structural
reforms would be included in the process.
The Commission was not immediately on board with the idea. In the days
after the October Euro Zone Summit, President Barroso instructed Director
General, Marco Buti and his staﬀ in DG Ecﬁn to come up with an alternative
reform-package, the so-called ‘two-pack’.4 In contrast, European Council Pre-
sident Van Rompuy gave an informal mandate to several of his Cabinet
oﬃcials to work with the Council Secretariat Legal Service to explore the
options for incorporating a balanced budget rule into EU law.5 This was the
start of the machine room process that resulted in the adoption of the
Fiscal Compact in March 2012.
By November 2011, the Council Secretariat Legal Service had drafted an
embryonic version of a Fiscal Compact that focused on incorporating a
balanced budget rule.6 Initially, the legal base was Article 126(14.2), which is
a passerelle clause that allows the Treaty protocol to be amended through a
unanimous Council decision. Van Rompuy Cabinet oﬃcials informally ﬂoated
the Secretariat draft with themember states, but theGerman government indi-
cated that it preferred a stronger legal instrument that could not be reversed by
a future Council decision. Instead, they preferred to use the ordinary revision
procedure (Article 48 TEU).7 Note that Germany was vetoing the legal form,
but not the content of the draft. In fact, the Council Secretariat draft would
set the stage for subsequent debates at the political level.
The proceedings at and around the European Council Summit of December
2011 have been extensively covered (Ludlow 2011: 10–13, 24–25). Suﬃce to
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say that this was not a particularly diﬃcult summit. German political leader-
ship resulted in a quick and relatively easy agreement to the Statement by
the Euro Area HOSG. There were few member states – not even Italy – who
dared to openly argue against the idea, out of fear for market punishment
(Moschella 2017). Seeing that the UK blocked the option of an ordinary
reform of the Treaties, due to Cameron’s request to add a protocol on
ﬁnancial services, the decision was taken, already before midnight, to go for
an intergovernmental agreement (IA).
The Summit Statement of 9 December endorsed the core of the balanced
budget rule in the November draft proposed by the Council Secretariat.8
However, given the change in legal form to an international agreement, it
was clear that more articles would have to be drafted. One aspect concerned
the enforcement of the balanced budget rule. While a protocol would have
automatically fallen under existing enforcement procedures, it was up to
the Council Secretariat Legal Service to ﬁgure out how enforcement would
work for the IA. The Summit statement merely noted that: ‘We recognise
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to verify the transposition of this rule
at national level’, but did not indicate how it could work.
The next step was to come up with a format and decide on the modalities
for turning this political declaration into a full-ﬂedged Treaty. This process
started with a letter on 14 December 2011 from Uwe Corsepius, Secretary
General of the Council, to the Coreper, in which he outlined the process, par-
ticipants and deadlines. Due to the British reservations, discussed above, there
was no established forum or format available. The Council Secretariat came up
with an intricate division of labour. The negotiations would take place in an ad
hoc working group, building on, but outside of, the structures of the Euro-
group Working Group (EWG). But the preparations would still be done by
the preparatory bodies of the Council. To ensure compatibility with the Trea-
ties and secondary law of the Union, the Council Secretariat Legal Service was
charged with drafting the ﬁrst version of the agreement. The Legal Service
copy-pasted verbatim the November draft into their ﬁrst draft text of the
Fiscal Compact, and ﬂeshed out the modalities of enforcement and other
issues in a ﬁrst draft tabled on 19 December.
In the machine room, leadership would be provided by a core group of
oﬃcials that bridged institutional boundaries. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the inter-institutional network, with the lines representing inter-insti-
tutional connections, which pivoted around oﬃcials from the European
Council President’s Cabinet (Odile Renaud-Basso, Jose Leandro), the Council
Secretariat’s Economic and Financial Aﬀairs Unit (Olaf Prüssmann) and Legal
Service (Therese Blanchet, Alberto de Gregorio) and the EFC/EWG Secretariat
(Pim Lescrauweat). In practice, the Secretariat of the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC) would act as the crucial node in the inter-institutional
network. The EFC bridges institutional divides, located within but acting
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independently from the Commission, preparing the work of the Council-
based Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) and staﬀed by Commission oﬃcials
as well as member states representatives. While the Council Secretariat
Legal Service de-facto acted as the penholder, it worked in close collaboration
with Commission oﬃcials within the EFC framework.
The Commission itself was represented by the Director General of DG Ecﬁn,
Marco Buti and the head of the Commission Legal Service, Luis Romero. The
Commission initially played a rather modest role, but once revisions to the
Secretariat draft started, the Commission provided a lot of written and oral
input that ensured that the Fiscal Compact would be compatible with the
revised SGP and other elements of the six-pack and upcoming two-pack. It
was the role of the ECB (represented by Jörg Asmussen and Gabriel Glöckler)
to try to strengthen the text, or at least to prevent ‘a substantial watering
down… of the initial general agreement on an ambitious ﬁscal compact.’9
The overall lead was with Van Rompuy’s Cabinet oﬃcials, particularly Odile
Renaud-Basso. Their main priority was to stay close to the November draft.
They therefore wanted to keep the discussions short and focused. Their strat-
egy was to have a limited number of plenary meetings in the machine room,
after which any open points would (have to) be taken up to the Eurogroup
Figure 1. Map of the inter-institutional network.
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meeting of 23 January and otherwise the Sherpa meeting of 30 January that
would prepare the European Council meeting.
Two things were noteworthy from the perspective of process manage-
ment. First, all documents would be issued as room documents. Second, to
avoid having to deal with all comments on a point-by-point basis, bracketed
texts were not used:
We were dealing with people who were not so familiar with how Treaty nego-
tiations normally work. Moreover, everything needed to be done very quickly.
From the side of the institutions, there was a quite strong steer on it, particularly
from the European Council President Cabinet. They did not want lengthy discus-
sions on every little detail, certainly not during the meetings. Basically, member
states were asked to shut up, or take it higher up.10
The meetings of the ad hoc working group would be chaired by the President
of the Euro Working Group (EWG), Georges Heinrich from Luxembourg. Three
plenary meetings were held – on 20 December, 6 and 12 January – to discuss
drafts and enable member states input. This rather condensed meeting
format forced member states to focus on what they really cared about. On
most issues, there would typically be only one or two dissenting views from
member states. The plenary discussion then served to show to these ‘lag-
gards’ that there was a clear majority in favour of the text provided by
institutions.
The ﬁrst meeting of the ad hoc working group on 20 December was used
for general comments. The only substantive issue on the table was the partici-
pation of the non-euro area member states, to be addressed in Title I. The
main message to the member states was the very tight timetable, which
forced them to stick closely to the agreement reached by the HOSG, which
had been based on the original Council Secretariat Legal Service draft (see
above). Therefore there was a strong need to rely on ‘the pragmatic
working methods of the EWG’.11 The Chair was determined to avoid the
typical ‘drafting exercises’ that we know from regular Council or IGC meetings,
in which participants would go over a draft text on a line-by-line basis multiple
times. Instead, the member states were asked to submit written comments to
the Secretariat before 29 December, which would take these into account
when writing a second draft. Germany’s input certainly did not surpass that
of others.12 France, in fact, provided more input, particularly on what would
become Title IV on economic policy coordination. However, these three
Articles would remain rather weak overall, and mostly restated the importance
of the existing macroeconomic imbalances procedures (MIP). In contrast, the
Commission provided two rounds of input that were much more inﬂuential in
shaping the text (see below).
The Chair planned time for one article-by-article discussion in the second
meeting on 6 January.13 The main part of the debate, unsurprisingly, was
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about Title III. The other Titles primarily required some ﬁne-tuning for national
consumption, for instance the explicit link between the ESM and the Fiscal
Compact in the preamble, which came in the third draft, or the participation
of the Euro ‘outs’ at the Eurozone Summits in Article 5.12.14 On Title V about
euro area governance, the major battles had already been fought in October
2011, leading to the so-called ‘ten commandments’ of euro area govern-
ance.15 There were minor turf battles about whether the ECB President
should be ‘invited’ or be considered as an integral part of the meeting, and
the EP representatives unsuccessfully tried to procure a somewhat bigger
role for their President. Finally, with regard to Title VI, the entering into
force and incorporation into EU law, surprisingly, there was hardly any
debate, also not about Article 6.16 the semi-automatic incorporation of the
intergovernmental Treaty into the EU legal framework.
In the third meeting of 12 January agreement was reached on most issues,
paving the way for the ﬁnal tweaks in the run-up to the European Council
summit. On 19 January the Chair of the Working Group sent a letter to the
member states, outlining the ‘open’ issues for the end-game.16 The ministers
endorsed the provisional deals reached by the working party on the deﬁcit
(and not debt) criterion, the exclusion of the Euro Plus Pact and the link
between ESM and Fiscal Compact.17 The Sherpas then rubber-stamped it in
the run up to the to the Eurozone Summit of 30 January 2011, where it was
showcased as one of the major steps of the overall strategy to ﬁght the
crisis.18
Institutional ﬁngerprints
In the following, we discuss the eﬀects of institutional leadership. The back-
bone is a systematic assessment of the ﬁngerprints that were left by insti-
tutional involvement in the legal text. These assessments are based on
interviews with participants and a comparison of the ﬁnal document to the
Franco-German letters of August and December 2011 and the Council Sec-
retariat’s ﬁrst and second draft of November and December 2011 and, sec-
ondly, a comparison of the ﬁnal text to existing EU law. We categorized
these eﬀects as: ‘substantial’, ‘some’ or ‘few’ institutional ﬁngerprints. A
detailed documentation of the evidence and comparisons is provided in
the online appendices.
Instead of discussing all the individual ﬁngerprints, we use them to make
three points. First, by drafting and managing the revisions of draft texts, EU
institutions laid out the tracks for the subsequent negotiations, in that they
set the parameters for what was included and the overall structure of the
ﬁnal deal. Second, institutional leadership ensured that, in spite of the ad-
hoc intergovernmental set-up of the process, the ﬁnal deal was compatible
with, if not almost redundant in relation to, existing and proposed EU
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legislation. Third, by controlling the negotiation process, the institutions
ensured that this watered-down and Communitarized deal was shepherded
through the machine room negotiations without any signiﬁcant changes. As
one of the participants put it:
The intergovernmental mode essentially served as the ‘surrogate mother’, while
the DNA shows that this was very much a Community baby.19
First, by developing the initial draft, the Van Rompuy Cabinet ofﬁcials and the
Council Secretariat Legal Service were able to lay out the tracks for the coming
negotiations. Instead of developing a parallel, ad hoc institutional framework
as for the EFSF/ESM Treaties, the Secretariat draft suggested to use Commu-
nity institutions in ways compatible with existing competences (see overall
legal form). The ofﬁcials also quietly decided which items in the Franco-
German letter of August 2011 were dropped from the agenda, like the idea
to oblige member states to undertake structural reforms or to use structural
and cohesion funds to support such reforms. It is noteworthy in this regard
that the second Franco-German letter, which came on the eve of the Decem-
ber European Council Summit, more closely echoed the Secretariat draft from
November instead of the ﬁrst Franco-German letter from August (see sup-
plementary appendix 2). Even more interestingly, the second letter re-iterated
several core German priorities (especially structural reforms), but these were
again not taken up in subsequent drafts. If Germany was on board with
these omissions, why would they repeat their demands in the December
letter?
Second, while it was formally an intergovernmental process, the insti-
tutions operated as forcefully and proactively as they would have in any
regular Community process. Most of the changes in the draft texts brought
the Fiscal Compact even more ﬁrmly into the fold of the Community, in par-
ticular with the revised SGP. There are plenty of ﬁngerprints that could be
mentioned here. For instance, the Secretariat ensured that EU law would
always trump any obligations included in the Fiscal Compact (Article 2). The
deﬁnitions of convergence towards ‘medium-term budgetary objectives’
(Article 3.1b) and ‘temporary deviations’ due to ‘exceptional circumstances’
(Article 3.1d & 3.3.) were aligned with the SGP. The automatic correction
mechanism (Article 3.1e) and the budgetary and economic partnerships
(Article 5) were equally aligned with existing legislation and the upcoming
two-pack. On the issue of enforcement, the Commission and Council
Secretariat withstood German pressure to confer the ability to bring non-com-
pliance to the ECJ to the Commission, by showing that there was no basis for
this in the Treaties (Article 273 TFEU).
Overall, the Commission’s technical input of 3 and 6 January served to
ensure the legal compatibility of the draft with existing EU law, which in
eﬀect watered down the novelty of the instrument. Instead of using track-
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changes, as the member state contributions did (see below), the Commission
notes contained fully revised articles, with legal and substantive justiﬁcations,
which were subsequently taken over in the fourth draft. For instance, in the
note of 6 January, the Commission explained how the automatic correction
mechanism could be made ‘fully compatible with the Stability and Growth
Pact provisions and in particular with the provisions on signiﬁcant deviation
in the preventive arm’.20 Additionally, the Commission proposed the draft
Article that committed governments to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into
EU law within ﬁve years, which was again adopted almost word-for-word in
the ﬁnal draft as Article 16.
Third, the institutional network was able to shepherd the draft through the
machine room with little input from member states. We can assess the eﬀec-
tiveness of this ‘shielding’ process, by comparing the November and Decem-
ber 2011 drafts of the Legal Service to the six subsequent drafts and to the
ﬁnal text (see supplementary appendix 1). Most noteworthy is the fact that
there are very few major revisions. Already in the days after the December
European Council Summit, representatives from the diﬀerent institutions
had come together to decide that this would all be done in a few short meet-
ings, with limited documentation (e.g., use of room documents, no bracketed
text, no circulation of minutes). There were limited opportunities (and a
narrow time frame) for member states to provide input and debate the
issues. Most member states had provided only minor track-changes to the
Secretariat’s draft, practically all of which were still ignored in the second
draft text (see supplementary appendices 1 and 2). Most of the debate, in
fact, took place within the institutional quadrangle in the run-up to the
three meetings (see Figure 1).21 Overall, the process was therefore about
ensuring compatibility with both the Conclusions of the HOSG, (role of the
EC President Cabinet and Council Secretariat Legal Service) and with existing
legal framework of the enhanced SGP (role of EFC Secretariat and
Commission).
Concluding comparison
The process tracing analysis revealed the leadership activities provided by the
EU institutions in the negotiation of the Fiscal Compact. In the Conclusion, we
compare the Fiscal Compact to the Euro Plus Pact and Contractual Arrange-
ments, to assess what happens when such activities are missing. All three
initiatives ﬁtted with Germany’s ideas about enhancing ﬁscal discipline and
inducing structural reforms, as reﬂected in the aforementioned Franco-
German letter of February 2011. The letter had, ﬁrst of all, called for a ‘compe-
tiveness pact’ to be achieved by introducing ‘concrete commitments [to struc-
tural reforms] more than already decided’ to be adopted at the national level.
Implementation of these commitments was to be evaluated by the
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Commission, and the introduction of a sanctions mechanism was to be exam-
ined. Regarding structural reforms, the letter for instance called for the abol-
ition of wage/salary indexation, reforms of the retirement age, common
assessment basis for corporate income tax, and mutual recognition of diplo-
mas and vocational qualiﬁcations.
The Commission was not opposed to a competitiveness pact in principle,
but they were concerned that new commitments might clash with existing
EU rules. The debate about the Euro Plus Pact was therefore a rather
strange one, with Commission President Barroso’s continuously emphasizing
that, ‘no competences are being withdrawn from the institutions’, while Chan-
cellor Merkel kept stressing that no competences were being transferred.22
While the EC President’s Cabinet and Council Secretariat were willing to
provide some support, particularly in preparing for the Eurozone summit of
11 March 2011, the Commission still did not warm up to increased surveillance
of national reforms.23 In their view, the Pact only replicated what they were
already doing, as part of the monitoring cycle of the European Semester.24
This reticence led Merkel to push the reforms through the European
Council, attempting to provide the instrumental leadership required together
with France.25 The resulting Euro Plus Pact of 25 March 2011 was, not surpris-
ingly, a non-binding declaration that would run for one year, after which it was
dissolved into the European Semester.
The plan for Contractual Arrangements is another example of the limits of
German (instead of Franco-German) political leadership. After the failed Euro
Plus Pact, and related attempts to strengthen commitments to structural
reform were not taken up in the Fiscal Compact, Germany launched the idea
of an explicit quid quo pro linking EU funds to structural reforms. When
launched, many observers were led to believe that all Eurozone members
would soon have to sign Brussels approved economic adjustment programmes,
like Greece and other programme countries.26 While contracts were undoubt-
edly a German idea, the European Council President facilitated decision-
making in the control room. President Van Rompuy kept putting the contracts
on the agenda of European Council (of October and December 2012, June,
October and December 2013). At the Sherpa level, Van Rompuy’s deputy
head of Cabinet, Didier Seeuws was tasked with ﬂeshing out the details
(Ludlow 2013: 12–13), with the European Council periodically endorsing their
work.27 There were passionate debates about the contracts, particularly at
the December 2013 European Council Summit, with the Sherpas standby to
explain the details. The Conclusions manage to address ‘Contractual Arrange-
ments’ eleven times. However, when the smoke had cleared, the mandate for
reform had not become more speciﬁc: ‘further work will be pursued’, and the
presidents of the institutions were invited ‘to report to the October 2014 Euro-
pean Council’ on the issue.28 By that time, the idea of contracts had been trans-
formed into non-binding ‘partnerships for growth, jobs and competitiveness’.
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What was again missing was instrumental leadership in the machine room.
The control room process was not connected to the grid (meaning the
machine room). There would be a few EFC meetings in which the contracts
were politely discussed, but there was no taskforce or working group
charged with translating these ideas into a proposal for a binding reform.
Again, the Commission was not a fan of the idea, but like on the Euro Plus
Pact, it was willing to provide some input, here in the shape of a Communi-
cation. The contracts were reframed into a ‘convergence and competitiveness
instrument (CCI)’ that would induce member states to engage with necessary
structural reforms andmonitor their compliance.29 These would becomeman-
datory only for member states under an excessive imbalance procedure (EIP)
and voluntary for all others. Furthermore, the Commission was keen to reduce
its own role to engaging in a dialogue about reforms with national govern-
ments and parliaments.30 This institutional strategy of non-engagement eﬀec-
tively came down to killing it softly.
Overall, this paper has sought to provide a more realistic metric for asses-
sing institutional leadership activities and their eﬀects. Many have reﬂected on
‘the rise of European Council centered governance’ and what this implies for
the role of the EU institutions.31 But current theorizing still clings to rather
heroic conceptions of leadership, and what it can accomplish, in the
context of the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis or beyond. The EU system
has always been characterized by interdependencies, also in the days of
Delors. But these interdependencies have been brought to the forefront by
recent crises. This brings us back to the paradox of European Council centered
governance. Increased involvement from the highest political level can
enhance, rather than diminish, the inﬂuence of those who are asked to
carry out their orders.
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1. And where the underlying preferences of other governments in relation to these
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2. Letter to EU 27 leaders. Reprinted in https://www.politico.eu/article/merkel-
sarkozy-outline-competitiveness-pact/.
3. Letter to President Van Rompuy, 17-8-2011. A second Franco-German letter was
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6. Author’s interview, Council legal service, Telephone, 13-11-2018.
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10. Author’s interviews, EFC and Commission services, 26-9-2017.
16 S. SMEETS AND D. BEACH
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